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The Traditional Burdens for 
Final Injunctions in 
Patent Cases c.1789 and Some 
Modern Implications 
H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui† & Sean Bottomley†† 
Abstract 
This Article reassesses the first two eBay factors for final injunctions—
irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies—in light of traditional 
equitable principles. Tracking most closely with tradition would require the 
Federal Circuit to recognize that in patent cases: (1) an injury it seeks to 
redress with a final injunction is future infringement itself, not merely follow-
on harms caused by future infringement; (2) it can presume future infringement 
from past infringement; (3) it can presume that legal remedies are inadequate 
to remedy future infringement; and (4) it need not require a plaintiff to show 
that alternative equitable remedies, like ongoing royalties, would inadequately 
redress future infringement. Moreover, the Federal Circuit can recognize, 
without relying on any presumptions, that the burden on the first two eBay 
factors is not onerous. A patentee can satisfy them by showing that a defendant 
is likely to infringe again and that any legal damages awarded at trial did not 
fully compensate the patentee for the life of the patent. 
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Introduction 
Not long after its creation in 1982, the Federal Circuit ruled that 
federal courts were to presume irreparable injury and the lack of an 
adequate remedy at law when considering requests for final injunctions 
in patent suits. Defendants bore the burden of rebutting these 
presumptions.1 In 2006, the Supreme Court decided eBay Inc. v. Merc-
Exchange, L.L.C., where it rejected a separate, broader rule from the 
Federal Circuit that final injunctions must issue absent exceptional 
circumstances to protect the public interest.2 Although the parties in 
eBay asked the Court to address the Federal Circuit’s separate 
rebuttable presumptions, it declined to do so. It instead confined itself 
to the broad observations that district courts must exercise their 
discretion “consistent with traditional principles of equity” and that 
“traditional equitable principles do not permit . . . broad classifica-
tions” or “categorical rule[s]” that require a trial court to grant or deny 
a final injunction.3 In light of these statements, which the Federal 
Circuit construed liberally, the Federal Circuit jettisoned its rebuttable 
presumptions in 2011.4 To obtain a final injunction, a patentee must 
 
1. Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
2. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006), rev’g 
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
3. Id. at 393–94. 
4. Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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now always prove that some future injury is likely—one caused by, but 
exceeding, any future infringement itself—and that the identified injury 
is not otherwise redressable by legal or equitable remedies. 
Nonetheless, the old presumptions of irreparable injury and the 
inadequacy of legal remedies remain top of mind. Scholars, for one, have 
criticized eBay for how its sweeping statements have indirectly laid 
waste to presumptions, not only in patent cases but in other areas as 
well.5 Legislators have introduced bills in the Senate or House for each 
of the last four years in an effort to restore the rebuttable presumptions 
in patent cases on requests for final injunctions.6 And there remains the 
possibility that the Federal Circuit will revisit the presumptions en banc 
or that the Supreme Court will take up the matter. 
In light of the interest that members of the Federal Circuit, 
Supreme Court, Congress, and others have in this issue, this Article 
scrutinizes the assumption (for it is only an assumption) that in patent 
cases presumptions of irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal 
remedies contradict “traditional equitable principles.” Rather than 
concentrate on 19th-century American traditions, a task underway by 
Adam Mossoff,7 we focus on equitable principles as they existed in 
England at the end of the 18th century. As well as directing courts to 
consider traditional equitable principles more generally, the Court has 
told us that, unless altered by Congress, the substantive prerequisites 
 
5. Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme 
Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 
Colum. L. Rev. 203 (2012); see also, e.g., Douglas Laycock & 
Richard L. Hasen, Modern American Remedies 443–46 (5th ed. 
2019); David McGowan, Irreparable Harm, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 
577, 582–84 (2010); Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual 
Property, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 455, 489–95 (2010); Doug Rendleman, The 
Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange, 27 
Rev. Litig. 63, 87–88 (2007). 
6. Restoring America’s Leadership in Innovation Act, H.R. 7366, 116th 
Cong. § 12 (June 25, 2020); Inventor Rights Act, H.R. 5478, 116th Cong. 
§ 3 (Dec. 18, 2019); STRONGER Patents Act, S. 2082 & H.R. 3666, 116th 
Cong. § 106 (July 10, 2019); Inventor Protection Act, H.R. 6557, 115th 
Cong. § 3(b) (July 26, 2018); Restoring America’s Leadership in 
Innovation Act, H.R. 6264, 115th Cong. § 12 (June 28, 2018); 
STRONGER Patents Act, H.R. 5340, 115th Cong. § 106 (Mar. 20, 2018); 
STRONGER Patents Act, S. 1390, 115th Cong. § 106 (June 21, 2017). 
Congress recently restored these presumptions in trademark cases. 
Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 § 226, 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) 
(abrogating circuit court decisions that had discarded the presumptions). 
7. Adam Mossoff, The Injunction Function: How and Why Courts Secure 
Property Rights in Patents, 96 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1581, 1587–1602 
(2021); Adam Mossoff, Injunctions for Patent Infringement (draft). 
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for obtaining injunctive relief in federal court depend on historical 
practices of the English Court of Chancery circa 1789.8 
Investigating the enforcement of invention patents in the Court of 
Chancery is not for the faint of heart. No 18th-century practitioner ever 
wrote a treatise with a view to anticipating and answering all the 
questions that courts might care about 230 years later in some faraway 
and rebellious land. Today, judges and litigants tend to focus on a 
smattering of printed reports from the late 18th century, along with a 
handful of printed reports and treatises from the 19th century. That is 
understandable. Courts and litigants have neither the time nor the 
resources to delve deeply into 18th-century practice, and many 
probably believe that few records survive from the period. But in fact, 
there is a whole host of extant material. Hundreds of primary sources 
remain, some in print but most in manuscript, and they can help us 
reconstruct what would have been known to practitioners and others 
at the end of the 18th century—the known “course of the court.” To 
know these materials is to know traditional equitable principles. 
We advance several critical points respecting final injunctions at 
the end of the 18th century. First, patentees faced no separately 
articulated requirement of demonstrating “irreparable” injury. 
Irreparable harm was an inquiry that played a role, if at all, on requests 
for interim injunctions and it concerned, in part, whether an alternative 
equitable remedy would suffice instead. No similar inquiry occurred at 
the final-injunction stage. Second, the inadequate-remedy-at-law 
requirement—the test for equitable jurisdiction—turned principally on 
the likelihood of future actionable wrongs (and not solely on the harms 
that might stem from those wrongs). Third, the Chancery could 
presume that future wrongs were likely from the fact of a defendant’s 
past wrongs. And lastly, the legal remedy of damages was presump-
tively inadequate because it could not redress future wrongs, meaning 
that additional retrospective actions were needed against recalcitrant 
defendants. It was this prospect that triggered equitable jurisdiction. 
Turning to modern implications, we show that eBay and Congress 
have done nothing to alter these precepts. Tracking most closely with 
tradition would thus call on the Federal Circuit to recognize that: (1) 
an injury it seeks to redress with a final injunction is future 
infringement itself, not just follow-on harms caused by future 
infringement; (2) it can presume future infringement from past 
infringement; (3) it can presume that legal remedies are inadequate to 
remedy future infringement; and (4) it need not require a plaintiff to 
show that alternative equitable remedies, like ongoing royalties, would 
inadequately redress future infringement. Congress can endorse these 
same steps without fear of uprooting traditional principles or eBay. 
 
8. Grupo Mexicano de Desarollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 
318–19 (1999); see also infra text accompanying notes 30–36. 
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Moreover, the Federal Circuit can simply recognize, without using 
any presumptions, that a patentee can satisfy eBay’s irreparable injury 
and inadequate-remedy-at-law requirements by showing that a 
defendant is likely to infringe again without a final injunction and that 
any legal damages awarded at trial did not fully compensate the 
patentee for the life of the patent. 
Part I briefly outlines U.S. law on patent injunctions from 1983 to 
the present. Part II turns to the Court of Chancery of the 18th century. 
Apart from explaining why cases from this period remain doctrinally 
relevant, it describes the usual course of patent suits in Chancery and 
its jurisdictional limitations. Lastly, Parts III and IV home in on final 
injunctions. They treat historical practices and explore the modern 
ramifications of those practices. Importantly, our Article takes no 
position on whether final injunctions should, as a matter of policy, be 
granted freely in patent cases, nor do we endorse or condemn the 
Supreme Court’s focus on 18th-century practices and principles. 
I. Final Injunction Practice in Patent Cases 1983–2020 
For the first 28 years or so of its existence, the Federal Circuit 
employed presumptions of irreparable harm and the inadequacy of legal 
remedies on injunction requests. The court often expressed the two 
concepts interchangeably, with irreparable harm used as the favored 
term. For preliminary injunctions, the court instructed judges to 
presume irreparable harm when a patentee could make out a “clear” or 
“strong” showing of likelihood of success on the merits.9 A weaker case 
required an actual showing of irreparable injury.10 On final injunctions, 
the Federal Circuit directed judges to presume irreparable harm 
unconditionally because the patentee had already proven validity and 
infringement.11 A defendant could rebut either of these presumptions 
by producing “clear” or “persuasive” evidence to “establish” that the 
presumed harm was absent.12 
But the Federal Circuit went further. Building from cases that 
acknowledged final injunctions as the norm, the court adopted a 
broader rule that final injunctions “will issue when infringement has 
 
9. Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
10. Id. at 1581 n.7. 
11. Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989).  
12. See respectively Roper Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 757 F.2d 1266, 1271–72 
(Fed. Cir. 1985); Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 
1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Polymer Techs., Inc. v. Bridwell, 103 F.3d 970, 
974–75 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharms., Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 
1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Unfortunately, the language quoted above muddles 
whether the court intended to shift a burden of persuasion or production 
to the defendant. 
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been adjudged, absent a sound reason for denying it.”13 In 2005, the 
court stiffened the rule when it demanded near-automatic grants. Under 
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., denials became proper only in 
“exceptional” cases to protect the “public interest.”14 This mandate 
produced an irrebuttable presumption on all the criteria for a final 
injunction, except for the public interest. The court achieved as much 
by overruling its own precedent sub silentio.15 
In 2006, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on whether this more 
demanding “general rule” was proper in patent cases.16 Holding it was 
not, the Court stated in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. that 
“traditional equitable considerations” apply to final injunctions in 
patent cases, no differently from other types of cases, and therefore the 
mere fact that a defendant had infringed a valid patent did not 
necessarily mean a final injunction must issue.17 A plaintiff seeking a 
final injunction in a patent case still had to satisfy the following “well-
established . . . four-factor test”: 
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an 
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as 
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; 
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the 
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) 
that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 
injunction.18 
The Court stressed that district courts were to exercise their 
discretion in granting an injunction in a manner “consistent with 
traditional principles of equity.”19 But it did not explain how the first 
two factors differed from each other, or why they were stated in the 
past tense.20 Nor did the Court define the type of injury that counted 
 
13. Richardson, 868 F.2d at 1247. 
14. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
15. Id. (implicitly overruling Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 
F.2d 858, 866–67 (Fed. Cir. 1984), without going en banc). 
16. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 393–94 (2006). 
17. Id. at 392–93. 
18. Id. at 391. 
19. Id. at 394; see also id. at 392 (“[I]njunctions ‘may’ issue ‘in accordance 
with the principles of equity.’” (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 283)). 
20. Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 Vand. L. 
Rev. 997, 1024–28, 1048–49 (2015) (discussing scholarly critiques); 
Gergen et al., supra note 5, at 207–14 (critique); John M. Golden, The 
Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate 
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under the first factor. We only know for certain that the second factor 
refers to the traditional trigger of equitable jurisdiction—the 
inadequate-remedy-at-law requirement—which functions prophylac-
tically to help preserve the constitutional right to a jury trial as it 
existed at the time of the Seventh Amendment in 1791.21 A party cannot 
be forced to face an equitable remedy assessed by a judge when an 
adequate remedy, and a right to a jury, would be available at law. 
Although the petitioners in eBay asked the Court to address the 
Federal Circuit’s separate rebuttable presumptions,22 it declined to do 
so. The closest the Court came was stating that a plaintiff “must 
demonstrate” the aforesaid four factors, and that “traditional equitable 
principles do not permit . . . broad classifications” or “categorical 
rule[s]” that require a trial court to grant or deny a final injunction in 
a patent or other suit.23 Having never mentioned the separate 
presumptions, none of the three opinions in eBay discussed whether 
they contravened traditional equitable practices or principles. 
On remand, the Federal Circuit jettisoned its general rule. But 
more importantly, the court later discarded its rebuttable presump-
tions. Acknowledging that eBay did not address them, the Federal 
Circuit nevertheless held in Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. that the 
Court’s aversion to “broad classifications” and “categorical rule[s]” 
signaled their end.24 Notably, the Federal Circuit did not assess whether 
 
Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 657, 694–98 (2009) 
(same); Rendleman, supra note 5, at 75–98 (same). 
21. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 48–49 (1989); Younger v. 
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971); Schoenthal v. Irving Tr. Co., 287 U.S. 
92, 94 (1932); Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 206, 212–13 (1882). 
22. Brief of Petitioners at 29–30, eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130); Brief for 
Respondent at 16–17, eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130); Reply Brief at 7, 
eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130). 
23. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391, 393–94. The Court had previously ruled in a con-
clusory fashion, and on a request for a preliminary injunction, that a pre-
sumption of irreparable harm on an ANILCA violation would be “contrary 
to traditional equitable principles.” Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 
480 U.S. 531, 544–45 (1987); cf. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
555 U.S. 7, 21–22 (2008) (holding that the standard for preliminary relief 
is “likelihood” not “possibility” of irreparable harm). But eBay did not 
cite Amoco for this proposition. More recently, the Court has indicated 
that a rebuttable presumption of all four factors for final-injunctive relief 
would be inappropriate on a NEPA violation. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson 
Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 157–58 (2010). But see Roman Cath. Diocese 
of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020) (ruling that violations of 
the First Amendment are intrinsically irreparable injuries); Osborne v. 
Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 147 U.S. 248, 258–59 (1893) (stating in dictum that 
courts can presume irreparable injury in ordinary takings cases). 
24. Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg., 659 F.3d 1142, 1148–49 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(alteration in original) (quoting eBay, 547 U.S. at 393). 
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its presumptions comported with traditional equitable principles. The 
briefing before the court mentioned the rebuttable presumptions only 
in passing, and no party sought to preserve them.25 
As a consequence of the Federal Circuit’s ruling, federal courts can 
no longer presume irreparable injury or the inadequacy of legal 
remedies. Treating the two concepts as closely related, the court has 
reconciled them as follows. First, a patentee typically must prove that 
it will suffer injury caused by future infringements, but the prospect of 
future infringement itself does not qualify as a cognizable injury. And 
second, a patentee must demonstrate that remedies available at law, 
such as damages, would be inadequate to compensate for the injury 
identified in the first step.26 For example, potential future lost sales 
caused by future infringements constitute injury, but unless the 
patentee proves otherwise, the court assumes that legal damages are 
adequate compensation for that injury.27 As we will see later, courts 
often treat the second inquiry as examining whether any monetary form 
of relief, including an equitable one, would redress the future injury.28 
One member of the court, Judge Reyna, has advocated that the 
Federal Circuit recognize future infringement per se as an injury sought 
to be avoided by a final injunction, rather than just the harms ensuing 
from that infringement (like lost sales or tarnished reputation). Thus, 
by his lights, violation of the right to exclude could itself constitute a 
cognizable injury under the first factor.29 
II. Enforcement in the Court of Chancery c.1789 
We focus on the English Court of Chancery in the late 18th century 
because the Supreme Court has ruled that the default equitable 
jurisdiction of the federal courts stems from, and is today 
“[s]ubstantially, . . . the jurisdiction in equity exercised by the High 
Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution and the enactment of the original Judiciary Act [of 
 
25. Non-Confidential Brief of Defendant-Appellee Pylon Manufacturing Corp. 
at 46 n.11, Bosch, 659 F.3d 1142 (No. 2011-1096). 
26. TEK Global, S.R.L. v. Sealant Sys. Int’l, Inc., 920 F.3d 777, 792 (Fed. 
Cir. 2019); Nichia Corp. v. Everlight Ams., Inc., 855 F.3d 1328, 1341–44 
(Fed. Cir. 2017); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs., Co., 809 F.3d 633, 639–
45 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
27. Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. Toro Co., 848 F.3d 1358, 1368–69 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017); Auto. Merch. Sys., Inc. v. Crane Co., 357 F. App’x 297, 300–
01 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
28. See infra text accompanying notes 152–158. 
29. Apple, 809 F.3d at 648–52 (Reyna, J., concurring); see also 35 U.S.C. 
§ 283 (injunctions “prevent the violation of any right secured by patent”) 
(emphases added). 
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1789].”30 Unless altered by Congress, the “substantive prerequisites for 
obtaining an equitable remedy as well as the general availability of 
injunctive relief . . . depend on traditional principles of equity 
jurisdiction” circa 1789.31 Relatedly, the Court has ruled that 
determining whether there is an “adequate remedy at law, which is the 
test of equitable jurisdiction” in federal court, must be tested against 
the legal remedies that “existed when the Judiciary Act of 1789 was 
adopted,” except insofar as Congress has “subsequently changed” the 
remedies32 or made the old remedies more readily available with the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.33 
In sum, despite the merger of law and equity procedure in federal 
courts in 1938, the Court often insists on the “historic division between” 
 
30. Grupo Mexicano de Desarollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 
318 (1999) (quoting A. Dobie, Handbook of Federal Jurisdiction 
and Procedure 660 (1928)). Section 16 of the Judiciary Act limited 
equitable jurisdiction to cases where no “plain, adequate and complete 
remedy may be had at law.” Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 
73, 82. Congress repealed that section in 1948 as part of a belated statu-
tory cleanup after the merger of law and equity procedure in 1938. Act of 
June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 869, 992, 996 (repealing Act of Mar. 
3, 1911, ch. 231, § 267, 36 Stat. 1087, 1163); H.R. Rep. No. 79-2646, at 
A221 (1946). But the repeal did not affect the inadequate-remedy-at-law 
requirement, see Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 382 & 
n.26 (1949), because section 16 was merely declaratory of the equitable 
principles that predated it, New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 3, 
5 n.4 (1799) (Paterson, J.) (“The rule was so before, and is so independent 
of the provision in the act of congress.”); accord Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. 
W.I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 569 (1939); Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 
U.S. 521, 525 (1932); Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 150–51 (1891); 
Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton & Woollen Co., 67 U.S. 545, 551 
(1863); Boyce’s Ex’rs v. Grundy, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 210, 215 (1830). 
31. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 318–19 (quoting 11A C. Wright, A. 
Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2941, at 
31 (2d ed. 1995)); accord Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 
164–65 (1939); Atlas Life, 306 U.S. at 568–69; Robinson v. Campbell, 16 
U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 222–23 (1818). 
32. McConihay v. Wright, 121 U.S. 201, 206 (1887); accord 1 Roger Foster, 
A Treatise on Federal Practice Civil and Criminal § 81, at 564–
65 (6th ed. 1920); W.S. Simkins, A Federal Equity Suit 15–16 (3d 
ed. 1916); 1 Thomas Atkins Street, Federal Equity Practice 
§§ 45–47, at 30–31 (1909); 1 C.L. Bates, Federal Equity Procedure 
§ 10, at 12 (1901); Oliver P. Shiras, Equity Practice in the United 
States Circuit Courts § 9, at 10 (Chicago, 2d ed. 1898). 
33. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 507, 509 (1959) (5–3 on 
this point); cf. 1 John Norton Pomeroy & Spencer W. Symons, A 
Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence §§ 276–277, at 617–18 (5th ed. 
1941) (explaining that common-law developments do not oust equity of 
its earlier recognized jurisdiction); 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on 
Equity Jurisprudence § 64(i), at 81–82 (Boston, 4th ed. 1846) (same). 
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the two systems.34 This is particularly so with remedies, where there 
“has been remarkably little merger of law and equity” due to their 
substantive nature.35 As the Court stated recently, the “substantive and 
remedial principles [applicable] prior to the advent of the federal rules 
[have] not changed.”36 
A. The Records 
The best way to reconstruct and understand late 18th-century 
English practice is to review the hundreds of intangible-property cases 
filed in the Chancery between 1660 and 1800. Our sources include 
manuscript court records (pleadings, affidavits, minutes, orders, and 
decrees); case reports, in print and manuscript; practice manuals, in 
print and manuscript; and other related primary sources. These are 
documents we have collected and reviewed over the last 15 years. The 
number of invention suits far exceeds what courts assume were 
litigated, and there are numerous copyright and printing-patent suits 
as well.37 Printing patents gave holders the sole right to print a work or 
a whole class of works,38 and they issued in a manner similar to 
invention patents.39 Notably, the steps for obtaining injunctive relief 
were identical in all pertinent respects across invention-patent, 
 
34. Bray, supra note 20, at 1000. 
35. Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 
530, 541 (2016). 
36. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 679 (2014) 
(alteration in original) (quoting 4 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1043, at 177 (3d ed. 2002)); see 
also Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1492, 1496 (2020) 
(explaining that “principles of equity” involve “matters like . . . modes of 
proof . . . and remedies”); Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 
522 U.S. 359, 378 (1998) (“[E]videntiary presumptions . . . are in effect 
substantive rules of law . . . .”); Dick v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 
446 (1959) (“Under the Erie rule, presumptions (and their effects) and 
burden of proof are ‘substantive’ . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
37. Sean Bottomley, Patent Cases in the Court of Chancery, 1714–58, 35 J. 
Legal Hist. 27, 32–37 (2014) (describing records); H. Tomás Gómez-
Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About Copyright Injunctions and the 
Inadequate-Remedy-at-Law Requirement, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1197, 1222–
25 (2008) (same). 
38. H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Stationers v Seymour (1677), in Landmark 
Cases in Intellectual Property Law 21, 26–27 (Jose Bellido ed., 
2017). 
39. Compare Sean Bottomley, The British Patent System During the 
Industrial Revolution 1700–1852, at 35–40 (2014), with Arnold Hunt, 
Book Trade Patents, 1603–1640, in The Book Trade & its Customers 
1450–1900, at 27, 37 (Arnold Hunt et al. eds., 1997). 
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printing-patent, and copyright cases.40 This Article draws on primary 
sources from all three types of cases, but it focuses on invention suits.41 
B. Basic Procedures and Relief 
Litigants commenced patent-infringement suits in the Court of 
Chancery with an unsworn bill of complaint. Bills set out the terms of 
the patent,42 any assignment of the patent to the plaintiff (if he was not 
the original grantee),43 and any extension of the patent term granted 
by act of Parliament.44 Having set forth the basis of the right, plaintiffs 
would then recite how the defendant and his confederates had infringed 
the patent. The bills then asked for several things. First, they requested 
a discovery of various matters, including the number of infringing wares 
the defendant made or sold. Second, they prayed for a final injunction 
to restrain the defendant from using, making, or selling the plaintiff’s 
invention or any other item that imitated, resembled, or counterfeited 
the invention. And third, they sought a writ of subpoena summoning 
the defendant to appear and answer the allegations laid out in the 
complaint. By the mid-18th century, bills also regularly requested a 
disgorgement of the defendant’s profits,45 which coincides with a similar 
development in copyright cases.46 
In an effort to invoke jurisdiction, plaintiffs would claim that the 
defendant’s conduct was “contrary to Equity and good Conscience and 
tend[ed] to the apparent wrong and injury of your Orator.”47 They 
would further state that they had exhibited their bills in equity because 
 
40. For the affinity, see Att’y Gen. v. Walker, LL Parker Exchequer 1693–
1745 MS 1, pp. 144, 148, Bodl. Viner MS 43, ff. 17r, 17v (Exch. 1739) 
(arg.); Blanchard v. Hill, LI Hill MS 5, pp. 93, 94 (Ch. 1742) (tm) (arg.); 
Anonymous, 1 Ves. Sr. 476, 476 (Ch. 1750); Goodeson v. Gallatin, 2 Dick. 
455, 455 (Ch. 1771); Horton v. Maltby, LI Hill MS 18, pp. 148, 149 (Ch. 
1783) (pat.). 
41. In citations, we identify the three main types of English cases as follows: 
(pat.) = invention patent; (pr. pat.) = printing patent; and (©) = 
copyright. A few cited cases involve other forms of exclusive rights, which 
we abbreviate: (calico) = linen printing; (roy. lic.) = royal license; and 
(tm) = trademark. 
42. E.g., Tomlyn v. Stephens, C5/43/113 (Ch. 1662) (pat.). 
43. E.g., Kay v. Butterworth, C11/2456/21, no. 1 (Ch. 1737) (pat.). 
44. E.g., Liardet v. Johnson, C12/1346/22, no. 1 (Ch. 1777) (pat.). 
45. E.g., Zomer v. Gapper, C12/749/21, no. 1 (Ch. 1754) (pat.). 
46. H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Equitable Infringement Remedies before 
1800, in Research Handbook on the History of Copyright Law 
195, 220–25 (Isabella Alexander & H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui eds., 
2016). 
47. Pope v. Mount, C11/513/43, no. 1 (Ch. 1733/4) (pat.). 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
The Traditional Burdens for Final Injunctions in Patent Cases c.1789 
416 
they had no remedy or “adequate Relief”48 at law. The bill in Bridges 
v. Fowler is typical in stating that 
your Orators cannot have an Adequate Remedy against the said 
Confederates at the Common Law nor can compel the said 
Confederates to Discover [certain matters,] . . . nor can restrain 
them from continuing or going on with their said Practices 
without the Aid of a Court of Equity[.] And for that Matters of 
this Nature are properly Cognizable & relievable in a Court of 
Equity[.]49 
Subpoenas would issue as a matter of course, summoning the 
defendant to appear and submit a sworn answer or otherwise respond 
to the complaint. The answer was the principal way of obtaining 
testimony from a defendant. The parties might later conduct additional 
discovery—chiefly through depositions (meaning, oral answers provided 
on oath and memorialized in writing by a court agent in response to 
written interrogatories)—after which the parties could set the cause 
down for a “hearing.” The hearing in Chancery was its equivalent of a 
bench trial. The court’s ruling following the hearing was called a 
“decree,” not a judgment. 
Along the way, the Chancery could grant four types of injunctions. 
The steps for obtaining them largely track those in copyright suits, 
which one of us has discussed in detail elsewhere.50 Briefly, (1) an 
injunction until answer was designed to last until the defendant filed a 
“full and perfect” answer—that is to say, an answer that responded to 
all the material allegations of the bill.51 After a defendant submitted a 
suitable answer, a plaintiff could seek (2) an injunction that lasted until 
the hearing of the cause.52 And at the conclusion of that hearing,53 or 
sometimes beforehand,54 the Chancery might also (3) enjoin a defendant 
while the case was being adjudicated at law to test the patent’s validity. 
Throughout this Article, we use the terms “interlocutory” and “inter-
im” interchangeably to refer to the three injunction types just men-
tioned. Lastly, at the conclusion of the case the court might decree (4) 
a perpetual (i.e., final) injunction.55 Alongside this final injunction the  
 
48. Morris v. Oldham, C12/379/15, no. 3 (Ch. 1766) (pat.). 
49. Bridges v. Fowler, C11/2134/8, no. 1 (Ch. 1750) (pat.). 
50. Gómez-Arostegui, supra note 46, at 196–220. 
51. E.g., Wedgwood v. Neale, C33/436, f. 16v (Ch. 1770) (pat.). 
52. E.g., Dwight v. Garner, C33/281, f. 898v (Ch. 1694) (pat.). 
53. E.g., Hills v. Wright, C33/259, ff. 313v–314r, C37/373 (Ch. 1682/3) (pr. 
pat.). 
54. E.g., Liardet v. Johnson, C33/448, f. 411r (Ch. 1777) (pat.). 
55. E.g., Stoughton v. Wilkinson, C33/342, ff. 118v–119r (Ch. 1723/4) (pat.). 
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Bill of Complaint, Bell v. Heath, C11/1532/5, no. 1 (Ch. 1736) 
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Chancery could also decree that the defendant deliver up any infringing 
items for destruction, disgorge any profits earned from the infringe-
ment, and pay costs.56 None of these remedies stemmed from any sta-
tutory authority, apart from costs.57 The only general statute touching 
invention patents, the Statute of Monopolies, neither created a cause of 
action for patent infringement nor provided any remedies for it.58 
The aforesaid equitable remedies should be contrasted with those 
available at law. Actions for the infringement of an invention patent 
were brought as actions for trespass on the case and the remedies were 
damages and costs.59 Damages were recoverable as a matter of common 
law and could include punitive damages assessed by the jury,60 particu-
larly when sought against a repeat offender.61 Costs were allowed by 
statute,62 and included, among other things, fees for attorneys and bar-
risters.63 Again, the Statute of Monopolies supplied no legal remedies. 
C. General Observations on Jurisdiction and Authority 
There is no question, of course, that the Chancery had jurisdictional 
limitations in the 18th century. The court would not entertain a suit 
and grant the final relief sought by the complaint when the plaintiff 
could obtain adequate relief for the same wrong in a court of law. “In 
all such Cases, wherein the plaintiff hath his Remedy at Common Law 
 
56. E.g., Morris v. Unwin, C33/436, ff. 281v–283v (Ch. 1771) (pat.). 
57. This general power to award costs can only obliquely be traced to 
statutory authority. John Beames, A Summary of the Doctrine of 
Courts of Equity with Respect to Costs 2–9, 159–60 (London, 
1822). 
58. Statute, 1624, 21 Jac. 1 c. 3; Bottomley, supra note 39, at 102–03. 
59. E.g., Morris v. Branson, KB139/99, f. 216v (K.B. Trin. 1776) (pat.) (£500 
damages, £113 10s costs); Brodie v. Hopkins, KB139/100, f. 68v (K.B. 
Mich. 1778) (pat.) (1s damages, £66 9s costs); Boulton v. Hornblower, 
CP40/3818, rot. 567 (C.P. judg. Mich. 1796) (pat.) (1s damages, £2002 
costs); Turner v. Hughes, KB139/104, f. 8r (K.B. Mich. 1798) (pat.) (£50 
damages, £33 costs). 
60. See generally Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. K.B. 205, 207 (C.P. 1763); Wilkes 
v. Wood, Lofft 1, 18–19 (C.P. 1763); Benson v. Frederick, 3 Burr. 1845, 
1846 (K.B. 1766); The Citizen’s Law Companion 110 (London, 1794). 
61. E.g., Morris v. Branson, Morning Chron., June 1, 1776, at 3 (K.B. 1776) 
(pat.); 1 James Oldham, The Mansfield Manuscripts 745 (1992) 
(transcribing trial notes taken by Lord Mansfield in Morris). 
62. Statute of Gloucester, 1278, 6 Edw. 1 c. 1, § 1; William Tidd, The Law 
of Costs in Civil Actions 2–3 (London, 1793). 
63. R. Boote, An Historical Treatise of an Action or Suit at Law 
176–78 (London, 1766); 2 Matthew Bacon & Henry Gwillim, A New 
Abridgment of the Law 263 (London, 5th ed. 1798). 
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for the very same Things, he shall not be relieved here.”64 Although bills 
of complaint nearly always declared that the plaintiff had no remedy at 
law or no adequate remedy at law, that declaration was pro forma. 
Neither its inclusion nor its absence mattered as much as what was 
alleged in the complaint.65 Those allegations described the nature of the 
suit and the ultimate objective of the plaintiff—e.g., a bill seeking a 
final injunction or a bill seeking discovery only—both of which helped 
determine whether the Chancery had jurisdiction.66 If the court 
determined it had no jurisdiction, it would dismiss the suit without 
prejudice and leave the plaintiff to her remedy at law. 
When the Chancery had jurisdiction to decree final relief—assum-
ing the case would eventually reach a hearing—it might also need to 
address whether to issue interim relief along the way, e.g., an injunction 
until answer or an injunction until the hearing. The court developed 
certain conventions for when it would act and in this respect it 
established an authority to act. Most well known is the irreparable-
injury rule, which, when invoked, assessed the mischief, if any, a plain-
tiff would suffer without an interim injunction and the mischief, if any, 
a defendant would suffer from an injunction.67 Apart from considering 
the relief a court of law could award to address any such mischief,68 the 
Chancery could also consider whether a subsequent form of equitable 
relief would suffice instead.69 An injunction granted after an answer, for 
example, might do instead of one granted beforehand, and an award of 
profits at the hearing might obviate the need to grant an injunction 
 
64. William Bohun, Cursus Cancellariæ 8 (Savoy, 2d ed. 1723). 
65. The Practical Register in Chancery 24–25 (Savoy, 1714); John 
Mitford, A Treatise on the Pleadings in Suits in the Court of 
Chancery by English Bill 43, 46 (London, 2d ed. 1787). 
66. Mitford, supra note 65, at 8; 1 Joseph Harrison & John Griffith 
Williams, The Accomplish’d Practiser in the High Court of 
Chancery 398 (London, 7th ed. 1790). 
67. See, e.g., Lord Orrery v. Newton, Ridg. t. H. 252, 252 (Ch. 1744); Smith 
v. Haytwell, Amb. 66, 66–67 (Ch. 1747); Anonymous, 1 Ves. Sr. 476, 476 
(Ch. 1750); Ryder v. Bentham, 1 Ves. Sr. 543, 543 (Ch. 1750); 
Fishmongers’ Co. v. E. India Co., 1 Dick. 163, 164 (Ch. 1752); Horton v. 
Maltby, LI Hill MS 18, pp. 148, 149 (Ch. 1783) (pat.); Mortimer v. 
Cottrell, 2 Cox Eq. Cas. 205, 205 (Ch. 1789) (arg.); Isaacs v. Humpage, 3 
Bro. C.C. 463, 465 (Ch. 1792); Patrick v. Harrison, 3 Bro. C.C. 476, 477 
(Ch. 1792) (arg.); Johnson v. Goldswaine, 3 Anst. 749, 750 (Exch. 1796). 
68. See, e.g., Duke of Grafton v. Hilliard, Amb. (2d ed.) 159 n.2 (Ch. 1736); 
Jackson v. Barnard, Ridg. t. H. 259, 260 (Ch. 1744); Anonymous, 2 Ves. 
Sr. 414, 414–15 (Ch. 1752); Pechel v. Fowler, 2 Anst. 549, 550 (Exch. 
1795). 
69. See, e.g., Gibson v. Smith, BL Add. MS 36016, pp. 148, 148, BL Add. MS 
36019, pp. 219, 219 (Ch. 1742); Univs. of Oxford & Cambridge v. 
Richardson, 6 Ves. Jr. 689, 701 (Ch. 1802) (pr. pat.) (arg.). 
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until the hearing. We anachronistically use the term “authority” here 
because the court’s decision that it lacked authority to grant interim 
relief might only result in the denial of a motion, rather than dismissal.70 
As we noted earlier, one of the issues that plagues injunction 
jurisprudence today is the uncertain meaning of “irreparable injury” 
and how the concept differs, if at all, from the inadequate-remedy-at-
law requirement. This is a problem we will revisit later. Those hoping 
for purity of conceptual diction in the 18th century will be disappointed. 
Although the phrases “irreparable mischief” or “irremediable injury” 
were used much more commonly during requests for interlocutory relief, 
and in the manner described previously, usage did slip from time to 
time.71 What matters more than the labels are the inquiries themselves. 
Determining equitable jurisdiction to decree final relief solely required 
examining the remedies available at law, while determining the court’s 
authority to enjoin a defendant before the final decree examined 
whether alternative legal or equitable relief would do instead of the 
interim injunction sought by the plaintiff.72 
III. Final Injunctions 
Because the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery largely turned on 
the end of the bill, we begin our discussion of final injunctions by 
treating the unusual scenario of a plaintiff seeking retrospective relief 
only and no injunction. If this occurred, that meant a plaintiff had 
 
70. The burdens for interim injunctions in patent and copyright cases are too 
intricate to recount here. We will note, however, that Chief Justice De 
Grey stated in a copyright case that it was no “objection that the party 
applying for [an interim injunction], has a remedy at law.” Donaldson v. 
Becket, Morning Chron., Feb. 23, 1774, at 2 (H.L. 1774) (©) (De Grey, 
C.J.). Moreover, ordering a defendant to keep an account of his profits, 
in lieu of an interim injunction, appears to have occurred only when the 
court had doubts about the merits of a plaintiff’s case and concerns over 
the hardship of an injunction. E.g., Stationers v. Carnan, C33/442, ff. 
188r–189r (Ch. 1774) (pr. pat.) (enjoining some activities while a case was 
sent to law to adjudicate the validity of a patent but allowing other 
activities if the defendant kept an account); Liardet v. Johnson, C33/448, 
f. 411r (Ch. 1777) (pat.) (same). 
71. E.g., Earl Bathurst v. Burden, 2 Bro. C.C. 64, 65 (Ch. 1786) (arg.); Dench 
v. Bampton, 4 Ves. Jr. 700, 704, 706 (Ch. 1799) (arg.). 
72. For a modern interpretation of the two concepts that most closely tracks 
18th-century English practice, see John Leubsdorf, The Standard for 
Preliminary Injunctions, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 525, 551 (1978) (“At trial, 
[irreparable injury] refers to injury for which there is no adequate remedy 
at law. At the interlocutory [stage], it denotes injury for which there is no 
adequate remedy—legal or equitable—at final judgment.”). For similar 
views, see Owen M. Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction 48 (1978); 
Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule 
110–13 (1991). 
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concluded that the defendant would not repeat his tortious acts. We 
then turn to the routine course in patent suits, which was to anticipate 
that the defendant would infringe again, and to pray for a final 
injunction in the bill. Whereas the first scenario typically undermined 
the Chancery’s jurisdiction, the second triggered it. After reviewing the 
history, we will see that the test for equitable jurisdiction was fairly 
lenient, that it depended in great measure on the likelihood of future 
wrongs, and that presuming equitable jurisdiction in patent cases—
which is what a presumption of the inadequacy of legal remedies 
accomplishes—comports with traditional equitable principles. We will 
also see that the Chancery did not require a plaintiff to demonstrate at 
the hearing that some other equitable remedy, in lieu of a final 
injunction, would not suffice to redress potential future infringements. 
A. Plaintiffs not Seeking a Final Injunction 
The clearest instance of resisting jurisdiction can be found in tort 
cases where a plaintiff sought retrospective monetary relief but no 
injunction. As a general matter, these cases are hard to find in equity 
because they were vulnerable to dismissal. Lord Hardwicke stated the 
general principle in 1745 in a suit involving a claim for “waste,” viz., 
the destruction of land, timber, or houses by a person who held them 
subject to a reversion or remainder in the plaintiff.73 There, in Jesus 
College v. Bloome, the defendant was no longer in possession of the 
land and could commit no further waste, and so although the complaint 
originally prayed for injunctive relief,74 the plaintiff did not seek a final 
injunction. At the hearing, Lord Hardwicke dismissed the suit, ruling 
that the plaintiff had a remedy at law for the past wrong by bringing 
an action for trover.75 He found no relevant precedent allowing the court 
to decree, under the circumstances presented, retrospective monetary 
relief where no injunctive relief could or would be granted.76 
 
73. On the affinity between waste and infringement, see, e.g., Att’y Gen. v. 
Walker, Bodl. Viner MS 43, ff. 17r, 18r (Exch. 1739) (Comyns, C.B.) 
(stating that the Chancery restrained “wast[e]” in copyright-infringement 
cases); Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2324 (K.B. 1769) (©) (Willes, J.) 
(“Injunctions to stay printing or the Sale of Books printed, are in the 
Nature of Injunctions to stay Waste . . . .”); Doolittle v. Walton, 2 Dick. 
442, 442 (Ch. 1771) (characterizing injunctions in infringement cases as 
falling under the “head of waste”); Goodeson v. Gallatin, 2 Dick. 455, 455 
(Ch. 1771) (noting that jurisdiction in invention cases stemmed from its 
jurisdiction in waste cases); Donaldson v. Becket, Morning Chron., Feb. 
24, 1774, at 2 (H.L. 1774) (©) (Camden, L.C.) (stating that copyright 
injunctions are “obtained for the purpose of staying waste”). 
74. Jesus Coll. v. Bloome, C11/1074/41, no. 1 (Ch. 1742/3). 
75. Jesus Coll. v. Bloome, 3 Atk. 262, 264, C33/386, ff. 27v–28r (Ch. 1745). 
76. Jesus Coll. v. Bloom, Amb. 54, 55 (Ch. 1745). For a copyright suit where 
the bill sought retrospective relief only, and the Court of Exchequer 
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We have yet to encounter an invention-infringement suit where the 
complaint prayed solely for retrospective monetary relief. This is no 
surprise. Counsel for patent holders would have known that the 
Chancery would likely dismiss the suit on the ground the plaintiff had 
an adequate remedy at law for damages. 
B. Plaintiffs Seeking a Final Injunction 
The power of the Chancery increased remarkably when it 
anticipated the repetition of tortious acts. Indeed, the court’s juris-
diction to decree final injunctions in patent cases for future wrongs was 
unquestionable in the 18th century, and it was not something the court 
required plaintiffs to revisit in each patent suit. It is not surprising, 
then, that no case can be cited from the period stating that a victim of 
infringement bore a burden of proving at the hearing that they would 
suffer some injury in the absence of a final injunction and that legal 
relief would be inadequate to compensate for that injury. Damages were 
deemed inadequate in cases where future infringement was likely, and 
courts could presume future infringement from past infringement. 
To start, the only remedy available at law for patent infringe-
ment—damages—was deficient. The principal reason was straight-
forward and stemmed from a legal conclusion, rather than a factual one. 
The legal remedy was limited to torts occurring before the action 
commenced. Common-law courts could not award damages for infringe-
ments that occurred after the action commenced, let alone in-
fringements expected to occur after judgment. That meant that without 
a final injunction, a plaintiff who succeeded in an action at law might 
have to file additional actions against the same defendant. It was this 
prospect that made the legal remedy inadequate.77 
 
reached a similar conclusion about its equity jurisdiction, see Keble v. 
Onley, E112/836/802, no. 1 (Exch. 1705), E161/64, f. 151r (Exch. 1705/6) 
(©). A report of the ruling is at BL Add. MS 22610, f. 11v (Exch. 1705/6), 
printed in Equity Cases in the Court of Exchequer 1660 to 1714, 
at 556 (W.H. Bryson ed., 2007). Accord Grierson v. Eyre, C13/594/14, 
no. 1 (Ch. 1802), 9 Ves. Jr. 341, 346–47 (Ch. 1804) (pr. pat.) (dismissing 
suit where the complaint did not seek an injunction); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 99–101. 
77. One can discern a follow-on harm from future infringement—in the form 
of the actual anticipated expenses of future litigation—but the Chancery 
did not specifically ask whether the legal remedy was inadequate to 
redress the costs of future prosecutions. The analysis occurred at a higher 
level of abstraction. Insofar as other follow-on harms of infringement (like 
lost sales) and their redressability at law might arise, those could form 
additional grounds for equitable jurisdiction. For example, a secondary 
reason for finding retrospective damages inadequate was that proving 
damage causation might be especially difficult if not impossible in some 
cases. E.g., Richardsons v. Univs. of Oxford & Cambridge (H.L. 1804) 
(pr. pat.) (Lord Ellenborough) (observing that where a plaintiff and 
another printer not named in the suit had equal rights to produce a work 
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One of us has previously identified a number of 17th- and 18th-
century authorities for the general proposition that a plaintiff could not 
recover damages at common law for wrongs (i.e., torts) anticipated to 
occur after commencing the action.78 But the doctrine is also reflected 
in 18th-century invention cases. The bill in Bell v. Heath is instructive 
in this regard. There, counsel for the plaintiff correctly stated that 
by the Strict Rules of the Common Law [your Orator has 
no] . . . means to restrain the [defendants] . . . from making & 
selling [the infringing wares] . . . but has remedy only by way of 
Action to recover damages for the Injury done to him[,] which 
must be repeated as often as the said [defendants] . . . shall think 
proper to disturb your Orator in the exercise of his said 
Invention . . . .79 
And in Blanchard v. Hill, the Attorney General also suggested as 
much while analogizing his client’s case, which dealt with a trademark, 
to invention and copyright cases: 
[T]he Ground of Granting Injunctions on these Occasions is that 
the Person who is Injured cant have an adequate remedy for it 
by a Recovery in an Action at Law[,] for such a Recovery won’t 
put a stop to repeating the same abuse for the future . . . . [T]his 
Case is on the same reason with the Proprietors of Books to be 
printed or prints, or patents for the sole use of new Inventions[,] 
in which Cases Prohibitions and Injunctions are frequent . . . .80 
 
in England, it was difficult to ascertain whether the defendant’s importa-
tion of an identical work into England would have taken income away 
from the plaintiff, given that without the infringing importation, the work 
might have been supplied to the purchasing public by the other authorized 
English printer rather than by the plaintiff), printed in Judgments and 
Extracts from Pleadings; The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge 
versus Richardsons 26, 30 (s.l.n. [c.1822]), NRS CS236/B/24/2, no. 3. 
78. H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Prospective Compensation in Lieu of a Final 
Injunction in Patent and Copyright Cases, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 1661, 
1696–99 (2010). For additional authority, see 2 Matthew Bacon, A 
New Abridgment of the Law *1, *4 (London, 4th ed. 1778); 5 An 
Abridgment of the Modern Determinations in the Courts of 
Law and Equity 135–36 (London, 1805); John Baker, Baker and 
Milsom: Sources of English Legal History 196–97, 200 (2d ed. 
2010) (describing a 1383 decision and a treatise from c.1516). 
79. Bell v. Heath, C11/1532/5, no. 1 (Ch. 1736) (pat.). 
80. Blanchard v. Hill, LI Hill MS 5, pp. 93, 94 (Ch. 1742) (tm) (arg.); accord 
Baskett v. Univ. of Cambridge, LI Coxe MS 54, pp. 267, 279 (K.B. 1749) 
(pr. pat.) (arg.) (“A further reason why the Court of Chancery may be 
said to interpose in Cases of this kind is that the remedy at Law gives 
[retrospective] Damages only but this Court preserves the thing in 
Specie.”). 
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Records of common-law actions are also revealing. Although 
infringement cases commenced differently in the two principal common-
law courts—by original writ in the Court of Common Pleas versus bill 
of Middlesex in the Court of King’s Bench—in both the action was for 
trespass on the case. The plaintiff would set out the various ways in 
which the defendant infringed the patent and identify when the 
infringement had begun. Importantly, because a plaintiff could only 
recover for infringements up to the time she had commenced the action, 
patentees limited their recovery in the King’s Bench to the day of 
“Exhibiting the said bill,”81 and in the Common Pleas to the “day of 
suing out the Original Writ.”82 William Hindmarch encapsulated the 
rule in 1846: “[A] Court of Law has power only to give a patentee 
damages for any injury he may have sustained by the actual violation 
of his right, after it has been committed . . . .”83 
Plaintiffs could benefit from something akin to issue preclusion,84 
and they could wait six years to sue again (the limitations period for 
infringement).85 But additional actions between the same parties 
inevitably raised new issues—or old issues that were not apparent on 
the record of the prior action—and to wait six years to file must have 
been as unrealistic then as it is now. This is why 19th-century sources 
speak of injunctions being necessary to avoid the inconvenience and 
expense of having to bring additional patent-infringement actions at 
law.86 Boiled down to its essence, if future wrongs were more likely than 
 
81. E.g., Taylor v. Sucket, KB122/360, rot. 94 (K.B. bill Pasch. 1770) (pat.); 
Horton v. Harvey, KB122/461, rot. 1828 (K.B. bill Pasch. 1781) (pat.). 
82. E.g., Arkwright v. Nightingale, CP40/3768, rot. 720–722 (C.P. writ 
Pasch. 1784) (pat.); Boulton v. Hornblower, CP40/3818, rot. 567–569 
(C.P. writ Mich. 1796) (pat.); cf. 3 William Blackstone, Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England 226 (Oxford, 1768) (“For the 
plaintiff cannot recover damages for more waste than is contained in his 
original complaint; neither is he at liberty to assign or give in evidence 
any waste made after the suing out of the writ . . . .”). 
83. W.M. Hindmarch, A Treatise on the Law Relating to Patent 
Privileges for the Sole Use of Inventions 305 (London, 1846); see 
also Sheriff v. Coates, 1 Russ. 159, 164 (Ch. 1830) (calico) (arg.) 
(“retrospective only”). 
84. See generally Trial of Elizabeth Duchess Dowager of Kingston, 20 How. 
St. Tr. col. 355, 538 n.* (H.L. 1776); Kinnersley v. Orpe, Dougl. 499, 499–
500 (K.B. 1780); Gahan v. Maingay, Irish T.R. 20, 54 (Exch. Ch. Ir. 1793); 
cf. also Liardet v. Johnson, LI Hill MS 20, p. 227, 1 Y. & C. Ch. Cas. 527 
(Ch. 1780) (pat.). 
85. Statute, 1624, 21 Jac. 1 c. 16 (limitations period for actions on the case). 
86. See, e.g., Smith v. London & Sw. Ry. Co., Kay 408, 415 (Ch. 1854) (pat.) 
(arg.); George Jeremy, A Treatise on the Equity Jurisdiction of 
the High Court of Chancery 327 (London, 1828); Hindmarch, supra 
note 83, at 305. Similar observations were made in statutory copyright 
cases, though those claims carried a shorter limitations period of twelve 
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not, then the remedy at law was inadequate, and equity had jurisdiction 
to intervene and decree relief. If the jurisdictional test does not seem 
onerous, that is because it was not.87 
Notably, this equitable principle was not limited to patent- and 
copyright-infringement suits. By way of example, the Solicitor General, 
John Scott, who was later appointed as Lord Chancellor Eldon, invoked 
the principle successfully in a 1790 case involving the unauthorized 
digging for ore: 
Now the remedy at law can at most be only for the injury done 
at the time of the commencement of the Action & if the defendant 
goes on digging it will commit so many distinct trespasses for 
which fresh Actions must be brought by the plaintiff from time 
to time which is such an inconvenience as will induce this Court 
to interfere.88 
There was one underlying factual consideration relevant to whether 
the court had jurisdiction to decree an injunction: whether the 
defendant’s activity could be expected to continue. If that was 
impossible, then, barring special circumstances inapplicable here, a 
plaintiff’s claim in reality could only seek retrospective relief, and an 
action at law was the appropriate course. Imagine, for instance, a patent 
that expired before the suit was filed. That aside, it appears patentees 
were not expected to prove that infringement would continue. Speaking 
to this point more generally in 1745, in the waste case mentioned above, 
Lord Hardwicke stated that the court would “presume[]” that “when a 
man has done waste he may commit the same again.”89 Two years later 
he reiterated the point, stating that even if a defendant claimed he had 
stopped  wasting  property,  the  court would nevertheless “presume he  
 
 
months, see Rundell v. Murray, Jac. 311, 314 (Ch. 1821) (©); Lawrence 
v. Smith, Jac. 471, 472 (Ch. 1822) (©), or six months, see Wilkins v. 
Aikin, 17 Ves. Jr. 422, 424 (Ch. 1810) (©). Cf. Edward Lloyd, The 
Law of Trade Marks 5 (London, 2d ed. 1865) (stating that in 
trademark cases the Chancery proceeds “on the assumption that the legal 
remedy is inadequate”); Ford v. Foster, 7 L.R. Ch. App. 611, 632 (Ch. 
App. 1872) (tm) (Mellish, L.J.) (repeated actions at law are inadequate). 
87. See generally 1 Harrison & Williams, supra note 66, at 396 (explaining 
that the legal remedy must be “clear and certain” and as “effectual and 
complete” as the equitable one); 3 Blackstone, supra note 82, at 438 
(stating that the Chancery had a “concurrent jurisdiction” and 
“cognizance” with courts of law in cases involving waste to property and 
“other similar injuries” that permitted it to enjoin). 
88. Flamank v. Gullett, LI Misc. MS 108, pp. 167, 168 (Ch. 1790) (arg.); 
accord Falmouth v. Innys, Mosely 87, 89 (Ch. 1728/9) (arg.); Coulson v. 
White, BL Hargrave MS 54, pp. 400, 400, 3 Atk. 21, 21 (Ch. 1742/3); 
Hughes v. Trs. of Morden Coll., 1 Ves. Sr. 188, 189 (Ch. 1748). 
89. Jesus Coll. v. Bloom, Amb. 54, 55 (Ch. 1745); see also supra note 73. 
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may do further waste.”90 Nineteenth-century cases certainly had no 
trouble presuming that a defendant who had already infringed an 
exclusive right, like a patent, would likely infringe in the future.91 
That one did not need to affirmatively prove future infringement 
or inadequacy is further borne out by briefs that Charles Yorke used in 
three copyright cases in which he served as plaintiff’s counsel at the 
hearing of the cause. The son of Lord Hardwicke, Yorke served as 
Solicitor General (1756–1762), Attorney General (1762–1763 and 1765–
1766), and briefly as Lord Chancellor (1770) for a few days before his 
death.92 The first suit involved common-law copyrights, the second 
statutory copyrights, and the third a mixture of both. The briefs sum-
marized the facts Yorke hoped to prove at the hearings and utilized 
documents, depositions, and excerpts of the defendants’ answers to sup-
port those facts. None of the proofs in the briefs contain any inkling of 
facts regarding the defendants’ future conduct or the remedies available 
at law. Rather, they focus exclusively on showing: (1) the plaintiffs’ 
right in a work, including by proving the execution of indentures, deeds 
poll, and receipts; the authenticity of signatures on those documents; 
the death of witnesses to those documents; the partnerships of plaintiffs; 
and the death of authors; and (2) the defendants’ infringement of a 
work, typically through admissions contained in the answers.93 
 
90. Att’y Gen. v. Burrows, 3 Atk. 485, 485, 1 Dick. 128, 128 (Ch. 1747); 
accord Countess of Strathmore v. Bowes, 2 Dick. 673, 675 (Ch. 1786) 
(registrar); Robinson v. Lord Byron, 2 Dick. 703, 705 (Ch. 1788). 
91. Losh v. Hague, 1 Web. Pat. Cas. 200, 200–01, 2 Coop. T. Cott. 59, 59 
(Ch. 1837) (pat.); Proctor v. Bayley, 6 R.P.C. 538, 542 (C.A. 1889) (pat.); 
William W. Kerr et al., A Treatise on the Law and Practice 
of Injunctions 270 (4th ed. 1903) (“[P]ast infringement of a recent date 
is primâ facie evidence of an intention to repeat the wrong.”); cf. 
Millington v. Fox, 3 My. & Cr. 338, 342–43, 350–52 (Ch. 1838) (tm); 
Geary v. Norton, 1 De G. & Sm. 9, 10–12 (Ch. 1846) (calico); Phillips v. 
Thomas, 62 L.T. 793, 795–96 (Ch. 1890) (nuisance) (contrasting quia 
timet injunctions where a plaintiff must demonstrate that reasonable men 
would expect a wrong to occur). 
92. John Sainty, A List of English Law Officers, King’s Counsel 
and Holders of Patents of Precedence 48, 65 (1987); Handbook 
of British Chronology 91 (E.B. Fryde et al. eds., 3d ed. 1996). 
93. See (1) Millar v. Taylor, Brief for Hearing, BL Add. MS 36193, ff. 88–90 
(Ch. 1765) (©) (involving The Seasons); Millar v. Taylor, C33/426, ff. 
68v–69r (Ch. 1765) (sending parties to law to test the viability of common-
law copyright, but continuing injunction in the meantime); (2) Millar v. 
Taylor, Brief for Hearing, BL Add. MS 36193, ff. 91–94 (Ch. 1765) (©) 
(involving The Complaint); Millar v. Taylor, C33/426, f. 60r–v (Ch. 1765) 
(granting final injunction); (3) Bathurst v. Donaldson, Brief for Hearing, 
BL Add. MS 36193, ff. 225–228 (Ch. 1767) (©); Bathurst v. Donaldson, 
C33/429, ff. 546v–547v (Ch. 1767) (sending parties to law to test the 
viability of common-law copyright, and continuing injunction in the 
meantime as to the statutory copyright). In 1769, the King’s Bench 
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Succeeding on the merits presumptively entitled a plaintiff to a final 
injunction,94 and we have never encountered a case that denied a final 
injunction on the ground that the successful patentee had an adequate 
remedy at law. Three cases spanning 100 years highlight these points. 
The first is the 1684 decree in Hills v. Wright, which involved a patent 
to print the Bible. There, Lord Keeper Guilford decreed that 
where it appeared to this Court that there was a right as it doth 
in this Case[,] the Law having determined the same for the 
plaintiff[,] Itt was Naturall for this Court to give releife for the 
same in specie[,] And doth therefore thinck fitt & soe orders and 
decrees that the [interlocutory] Injunction \formerly granted in 
this Cause . . . bee made perpetuall/ . . . .95 
The second was decided in the Court of Exchequer, on its equity 
side, and involved another printing patent. Chief Baron Skynner stated 
that granting a final injunction at the hearing was simply “a matter of 
form.”96 The Court of Exchequer shared an equitable jurisdiction with 
the Chancery and followed the same basic principles.97 And the third 
suit involved an invention patent. There, Baron Eyre, who was sitting 
 
upheld common-law copyright in Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303 (K.B. 
1769), leading the Chancery to grant a final injunction in the first case. 
Millar v. Taylor sub nom. Grant v. Taylor, C33/433, ff. 413r–414r (Ch. 
1770). The third case appears to have settled after Millar. 
94. For decrees granting final injunctions, see, e.g., Hills v. Wright, C33/261, 
ff. 282v–283r (Ch. 1683/4) (pr. pat.); Stationers v. Wright, C33/262, f. 
260r–v (Ch. 1683/4) (pr. pat.); Baskett v. Parsons, C33/329, ff. 418v–419r 
(Ch. 1718) (pr. pat.); Knaplock v. Curll, C33/339, f. 12r–v (Ch. 1722) (©); 
Stoughton v. Wilkinson, C33/342, ff. 118v–119r (Ch. 1723/4) (pat.); Webb 
v. Rose, C33/358, ff. 308v–309r, C33/362, f. 55r–v (Ch. 1732–33) (©); Gibbs 
v. Cole, C33/365, f. 222r–v (Ch. 1735/6) (© & roy. lic.); Baller v. Watson, 
C33/369, ff. 315v–316v (Ch. 1737) (©); Blackwell v. Harper, 2 Atk. 93, 96 
(Ch. 1740) (©); Manby v. Owen, C33/410, f. 396r–v (Ch. 1758) (©); Millar 
v. Taylor, C33/426, f. 60r–v (Ch. 1765) (©); Nicoll v. Simpson, C33/430, 
ff. 251v–252v (Ch. 1768) (©); Millar v. Taylor sub nom. Grant v. Taylor, 
C33/433, ff. 413r–414r (Ch. 1770) (©); Macklin v. Richardson, C33/436, 
ff. 35v–36r (Ch. 1770) (©); Morris v. Unwin, C33/436, ff. 281v–283v (Ch. 
1771) (pat.); Morris v. Unwin, C33/438, f. 146r–v (Ch. 1772) (pat.); Becket 
v. Donaldson, C33/439, ff. 26r–27r (Ch. 1772) (©); Pyle v. Falkener, 
C33/442, ff. 309v–311r (Ch. 1774) (© & roy. lic.); Bach v. Longman, 
C33/447, ff. 582v–583r (Ch. 1777) (© & roy. lic.); Mason v. Murray, C33/-
452, ff. 486r–487r (1779) (©); Liardet v. Johnson, C33/454, ff. 527v–530r 
(Ch. 1780) (pat.); Beckford v. Hood, C33/500, f. 504r–v (Ch. 1798) (©). 
95. Hills v. Wright, C33/261, ff. 282v–283r (Ch. 1683/4) (pr. pat.). 
96. Eyre v. Carnan, 5 Bacon Abr. (5th ed.) 597, 600 (Exch. 1781) (pr. pat.). 
97. Charles Barton, An Historical Treatise of a Suit in Equity 17, 
22 (London, 1796); W.H. Bryson, The Equity Side of the 
Exchequer 9 (1975). 
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by designation in the Chancery, called final injunctions the “Ordinary” 
form of relief in patent cases—something to which a patentee who had 
succeeded on the merits would be “intitled”—as distinguished from a 
few areas where he called injunctions an “extraordinary remedy.”98 
Although the Chancery undoubtedly had jurisdiction to grant final 
injunctions in patent (and other) cases—due to the prospect of 
continuing wrongs—we must also say a word about whether the 
Chancery required patentees to demonstrate that alternative equitable 
remedies would not suffice to redress future infringements. The poten-
tial inquiry here would be prudential rather than jurisdictional. The 
answer, again, is no, and the reason, once more, is simple. The court’s 
ability to award monetary relief in these types of cases was limited to 
a disgorgement of the defendant’s profits alongside a final injunction. 
As Lord Hardwicke put it, again in the context of waste, monetary relief 
in Chancery was proper when “incident[al]” to injunctive relief.99 
“Where the bill is for an injunction, and waste has been already 
committed, the court, to prevent a double suit,” meaning a suit in 
equity for prospective relief and an action at law for retrospective relief, 
“will decree an account, and satisfaction for what is past.”100 This meant 
that equitable monetary relief in patent- and copyright-infringement 
suits was backward looking.101 Not surprisingly, it also meant that the 
Chancery did not utilize ongoing royalties in these cases.102 
The hardship a defendant might suffer from a final injunction and 
the interests of the public, though factors listed in eBay, are not the 
 
98. Liardet v. Johnson, LI Hill MS 20, pp. 227, 240–41, 243, 1 Y. & C. Ch. 
Cas. 527, 532–33 (Ch. 1780) (pat.); see also Blackwell v. Harper, BL 
Hargrave MS 412, ff. 130v, 131v (Ch. 1740) (©) (Hardwicke, L.C.) (stating 
that the copyright statute “secures the property [in a copyright] so as to 
entitle the plaintiff to an Injunction in this Court”); Opinion of William 
Murray, Solic. Gen. (later ennobled as Lord Mansfield), printed in Peti-
tion of the Booksellers of London 11 (Sess. July 15, 1746) (©), SL Session 
Papers v. 6, no. 41 (“Authors and Proprietors . . . always have Recourse 
to a Court of Equity, which proceeds upon the Foundation of the Property 
declared by the [copyright] Act, and [the court] gives a specifick Relief, 
by granting Injunctions to restrain . . . pirated Editions . . . .”). 
99. Jesus Coll. v. Bloome, BL Add. MS 36017, pp. 121, 123, 3 Atk. 262, 262 
(Ch. 1745); Jesus Coll. v. Bloom, Amb. 54, 55 (Ch. 1745) (“[T]his Court 
will decree an account of waste done at the same time, with an 
injunction . . . .”); see also supra text accompanying notes 73–76. 
100. Jesus Coll., 3 Atk. at 262. 
101. See Grierson v. Eyre, 9 Ves. Jr. 341, 346–47, GT Eldon MS 1803–1804, 
ff. 132r–133v (Ch. 1804) (pr. pat.); Baily v. Taylor, 1 Russ. 73, 76 (Ch. 
1829) (©); Millington v. Fox, 3 My. & Cr. 338, 350–51 (Ch. 1838) (tm) 
(arg.); Bacon v. Jones, 4 My. & Cr. 433, 435 (Ch. 1839) (pat.) (arg.); 
Smith v. London & Sw. Ry. Co., Kay 408, 415 (Ch. 1854) (pat.). 
102. Gómez-Arostegui, supra note 78, at 1699–1707. 
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focus of this Article. Nevertheless, we will note that Baron Eyre 
dismissed the former in the invention case mentioned previously: 
Where it restrains in Cases of Patents it takes nothing from the 
Individuals restrained which is their right. It only hinders them 
from invading anothers [right] . . . . As to tying up the Party[,] 
the Right to do so is established.103 
[As to the argument] that it will be a hardship to tie the 
Defendant up for ever from making this Cement[,] . . . if the 
Plaintiffs have established their Right at Law, they are intitled 
to tie him up. This is not different from other Injunctions in like 
Cases.104 
Hardship (and/or the public interest) are considerations we have 
encountered on interlocutory injunctions, but, even there, largely in 
suits where the underlying merits of the plaintiff’s case were 
questionable.105 We are aware of only one intangible-property case 
where a defendant’s hardship affected a decree, and it did so only 
tangentially. There, the Court of Chancery modified a seizure order to 
permit a defendant to transport infringing books from England back to 
Scotland, where they could be sold legally.106 
C. Subsequent Developments 
The retrospective limit on damages at common law for continuing 
wrongs largely remains the rule in England today,107 meaning that the 
legal remedy continues to be inadequate.108 Over the years, as 
Parliament enacted additional patent statutes, it did nothing to 
abrogate the common-law bar, though a rules committee did eventually 
 
103. Liardet v. Johnson, GT Eldon MS, Notes of Cases 1779, pp. 34, 46, 47 
(Ch. 1780) (pat.). 
104. Liardet v. Johnson, LI Hill MS 20, pp. 227, 242–43, 1 Y. & C. Ch. Cas. 
527, 533 (Ch. 1780) (pat.). 
105. E.g., Hills v. Univ. of Oxford, 1 Vern. 275, 276 (Ch. 1684) (pr. pat.); see 
also Univs. of Oxford & Cambridge v. Richardson, 6 Ves. Jr. 689, 711 
(Ch. 1802) (pr. pat.) (considering public interest to favor an interlocutory 
injunction where there was some doubt about the patentee’s standing); 
see also supra text accompanying notes 67–70 (discussing hardship). 
106. Baskett v. Parsons, C33/337, ff. 124v–125r (Ch. 1721/2) (pr. pat.); see 
also H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, Patent and Copyright Exhaustion in 
England circa 1800, at 41–45 (2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2905847. 
107. James Edelman, McGregor on Damages 396–99 (20th ed. 2018). 
108. Jaggard v. Sawyer, [1995] 2 All E.R. 189, 204–05 (C.A. 1994) (Millett, 
L.J.) (stating that the common-law remedy in cases of continuing trespass 
remains inadequate due to legal damages still “cover[ing] the past only 
and not the future”). 
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permit courts to consider actionable wrongs through the time of trial.109 
Nevertheless, developments on the equity side eclipsed the legal remedy 
in some respects. In 1858, Parliament empowered the Chancery to 
award monetary relief in lieu of a final injunction for future wrongful 
acts.110 This power was not limited to patent cases but applied to all 
manner of suits. According to the leading 19th-century authority on the 
subject, creating this new equitable remedy did not alter traditional 
equity practice on final injunctions. That would have required a more 
specific Parliamentary directive: 
[T]he Court of Chancery has repudiated the notion that the Legis-
lature intended to turn that Court into a tribunal for legalizing 
wrongful acts . . . . Expropriation, even for a money consider-
ation, is only justifiable when Parliament has sanctioned it.111 
Plaintiffs thus remained “prima facie” entitled to an injunction,112 
including in patent cases.113 That meant it was incumbent on defendants 
to prove their case was an “exceptional” one, warranting no injunction, 
such as by demonstrating that future actionable wrongs were unlikely; 
or that the anticipated injury to the plaintiff’s “legal rights” was small, 
that the injury could be compensated by a “small money payment,” 
and that the injunction would unduly oppress the defendant.114 
Although the U.K. Supreme Court has more recently broadened a 
court’s discretion to deny a final injunction, it has reaffirmed that the 
“prima facie position is that an injunction should be granted, so the 
legal burden [i.e., the burden of persuasion] is on the defendant to show 
why it should not.”115 This allocation of burdens applies in patent-
infringement suits: “[An] injunction to restrain future infringements is 
 
109. Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, Order 36, Rule 58. 
110. Chancery Amendment Act (Lord Cairns’ Act) 1858, 21 & 22 Vict. c. 27, 
§ 2 (current version at Senior Courts Act 1981, c. 54, § 50); see also 
Gómez-Arostegui, supra note 78, at 1699–1701, 1706. 
111. Shelfer v. City of London Elec. Lighting Co., [1895] 1 Ch. 287, 315–16 
(C.A. 1894) (nuisance) (Lindley, L.J.). 
112. Id. at 316, 321, 322. 
113. Proctor v. Bayley, 6 R.P.C. 538, 542 (C.A. 1889) (pat.); William W. 
Kerr, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Injunctions in 
Equity 435 (London, 1867); William Joyce, The Doctrines and 
Principles of the Law of Injunctions 150 (London, 1877); see also 
Hindmarch, supra note 83, at 321, 354, 361. 
114. Shelfer, 1 Ch. at 310–24; Vale Nicolas, The Law and Practice 
Relating to Letters Patent for Inventions 203–04 (1904). 
115. Coventry v. Lawrence, [2014] UKSC 13, ¶ 121 (Lord Neuberger) 
(nuisance); accord Fisher v. Brooker, [2009] UKHL 41, ¶¶ 16–19 (Lord 
Hope) (©). 
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the normal remedy [and] . . . the burden is on the defendant to give 
reasons why such an injunction should not be granted.”116 
IV. Modern Implications 
So what can U.S. stakeholders make of this history? Most broadly, 
it could lead courts to presume that all four eBay factors favor 
patentees on final injunctions, until the defendant rebuts them. Doing 
so would take the Federal Circuit to the position it held just before its 
2005 decision in eBay.117 Our focus, however, is on how the history 
affects the first two eBay factors alone: irreparable injury and the 
inadequacy of legal remedies. Adhering to traditional equitable 
principles would counsel the Federal Circuit to recognize that (1) future 
infringement itself is a cognizable injury, (2) legal remedies remain 
inadequate today because they continue to be limited retrospectively, 
and (3) courts can presume the existence of the first two eBay factors.  
In the first two sections that follow, we discuss these steps and 
demonstrate that taking them does not clash with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in eBay or federal patent legislation. A third section examines 
a recently emerged requirement, post-eBay, that patentees must also 
demonstrate that alternative equitable remedies, in the form of ongoing 
royalties, would imperfectly redress future infringements. We discuss 
how neither Congress nor the Court has imposed such an obligation. 
A. Cognizable Injury: Future Infringement 
As we have already shown, the Court of Chancery did not engage 
in a separate “irreparable” injury analysis at the final-injunction stage. 
But it remains possible to situate traditional equitable principles within 
the first eBay factor by recognizing that future injury is the proper 
focus of injunctive relief (rather than past injury, as the eBay decision 
seems to require), and that future infringement per se is a cognizable 
future injury. Any “irreparability” analysis of the injury should be left 
to the second eBay factor, something lower courts are already doing. 
To start, the Supreme Court in eBay did not overrule the principle 
that injunctions are typically designed to redress future wrongs, rather 
than past ones.118 It might appear that it did, given that the Court 
 
116. Evalve Inc. v. Edwards Lifesciences Ltd., [2020] EWHC 513, ¶ 73 (pat.); 
accord Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Bos. Sci. Scimed Inc., [2018] EWHC 
1256, ¶ 13 (pat.); HTC Corp. v. Nokia Corp., [2013] EWHC 3778, ¶ 8 
(pat.). 
117. See supra text accompanying note 13. The caveat being that it might 
clash with the Supreme Court’s decision in Monsanto. See supra note 23. 
118. United States v. Or. State Med. Soc’y, 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952) (“The 
sole function of an action for an injunction is to forestall future 
violations.”); Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 326 (1928) (“[A] 
suit for an injunction deals primarily, not with past violations, but with 
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instructed courts to focus on past irreparable injury (“has suffered”) 
rather than future injury.119 But the Federal Circuit has correctly 
treated that as an accidental slip—and one not meant as an exclusive 
limitation.120 So has the Supreme Court. Four years after eBay, it 
realigned itself with traditional principles by subtly redirecting courts 
to focus on a plaintiff’s future injury on final injunctions.121 Nor did 
eBay reject the principle that a future violation or tort could constitute 
a cognizable injury per se—it only rejected using a statutory right to 
exclude as the sole basis for granting an injunction.122 
Furthermore, in cases decided well before (and left untouched by) 
eBay,123 the Court recognized, also in accordance with the Court of 
Chancery, that preventing future trespasses and avoiding additional 
actions between the same parties were well-known bases for triggering 
equitable jurisdiction.124 Harnessing this general principle in patent 
cases, the Court stated in 1908: 
It hardly needs to be pointed out that the right [of a patent] can 
only retain its attribute of exclusiveness by a prevention of its 
violation . . . . If the conception of the law [is] that a judgment in 
an action at law is reparation for the trespass, it is only for the 
 
threatened future ones . . . .”). 
119. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
120. E.g., Endo Pharms. Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 731 F. App’x 962, 
975 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics 
Corp., 875 F.3d 1369, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Nichia Corp. v. Everlight 
Ams., Inc., 855 F.3d 1328, 1341–44 (Fed. Cir. 2017); O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. 
v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 449 F. App’x 923, 932 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
121. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156, 162 (2010); see 
also Gergen et al., supra note 5, at 209–10 (critiquing use of past tense in 
eBay). 
122. eBay, 547 U.S. at 392–93; see also 35 U.S.C. § 283 (injunctions “prevent 
the violation of any right secured by patent” (emphases added)).  
123. Accord Innovation in America: How Congress Can Make our Patent 
System STRONGER: Hearing on S. 2082 Before the Subcomm. on Intell. 
Prop. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 22 (2019) (statement 
of Adam Mossoff, Professor, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason 
University), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3457804. 
124. E.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 59 (1975); United 
States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953); Donovan v. Penn. 
Co., 199 U.S. 279, 304–05 (1905); City of Walla Walla v. Walla Walla 
Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 12 (1898); Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton 
& Woollen Co., 67 U.S. 545, 551 (1863); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & 
Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518, 562–64 (1852); accord 1 Pomeroy & 
Symons, supra note 33, §§ 252, 263, 267, 271 (discussing principle); Dan 
B. Dobbs & Caprice L. Roberts, Law of Remedies 93 (3d ed. 2018) 
(same); Laycock, supra note 72, at 73–75 (same); Gergen et al., supra 
note 5, at 220–23, 235–37 (same). 
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particular trespass that is the ground of the action. There may be 
other trespasses and continuing wrongs and the vexation of many 
actions. These are well-recognized grounds of equity jurisdiction, 
especially in patent cases, and a citation of cases is unnecessary.125 
Because of its accidental focus on past injury alone, eBay said 
nothing about how probable a future injury must be for a court to 
retain its equitable jurisdiction to grant a final injunction. But the 
Court’s earlier cases do, and they demonstrate that the standard, like 
that of the 18th century, is not demanding. In its only patent case to 
address the point directly, Goshen Mfg. Co. v. Hubert A. Myers Mfg. 
Co., the Court ruled that future patent infringement need only be 
“reasonably apprehended.”126 It went on to note that the requisite proof 
for or against could be drawn from a defendant’s alleged past 
infringement, whether a defendant retained the means for further 
infringement, and how strenuously a defendant contested the plaintiff’s 
right or asserted its own rights.127 A presumption of future infringement 
from adjudicated past infringement was neither sought nor discussed in 
Goshen, so the Court had no occasion to endorse or reject one. And, of 
course, eBay did not address so limited a presumption either.128 
 
125. Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 430 (1908); 
accord Goshen Mfg. Co. v. Hubert A. Myers Mfg. Co., 242 U.S. 202, 207–
08 (1916); Clark v. Wooster, 119 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1886); Root v. Ry. 
Co., 105 U.S. 189, 216 (1882); Beirne Stedman, Patents § 250, at 606 
(1939); 3 Anthony William Deller, Walker on Patents § 538, at 
1817 (1937); George Tucker Bispham & Joseph D. McCoy, The 
Principles of Equity 707–08 (10th ed. 1922); William Macomber, 
The Fixed Law of Patents 39–40 (2d ed. 1913); 3 William C. 
Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions § 932, at 
112, § 1088, at 400–01, § 1094, at 414 (Boston, 1890); 2 Story, supra 
note 33, §§ 930–931, at 262–63; see also Gómez-Arostegui, supra note 78, 
at 1730 (discussing principle). 
  Relatedly, the Supreme Court has not overruled its long-standing 
authority, following 18th-century principles, that “in order to exclude a 
concurrent remedy [in] equity,” the legal remedy “must be as complete, 
as practical and as efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt 
administration, as the remedy in equity.” Walla Walla, 172 U.S. at 12; 
accord Twp. of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 629 (1946); 
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 214 (1923); Boise Artesian Hot & 
Cold Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U.S. 276, 281 (1909); Davis v. Wakelee, 
156 U.S. 680, 688 (1895); Parker, 67 U.S. at 551. For an 18th-century 
statement of this principle, see supra note 87. 
126. Goshen, 242 U.S. at 208 (defendant claimed it had ceased to infringe). 
127. Id. at 207. 
128. See supra text accompanying note 22. 
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The Court later elaborated on the equitable trigger in an antitrust 
case: 
The necessary determination is that there exists some cognizable 
danger of recurrent violation, something more than mere 
possibility which serves to keep the case alive. . . . To be 
considered are the bona fides of the expressed intent to comply 
[with the law], the effectiveness of the discontinuance[,] and, in 
some cases, the character of the past violations.129 
Even if the Court in eBay had wanted to discard the substantive 
principles of the Court of Chancery—and the Court’s own decisions 
employing them—it would have been hard pressed to do so given that 
Congress has never disturbed those principles in the many patent laws 
it has enacted over the years. Every mention of equitable jurisdiction 
in patent legislation, from the first explicit recognition in 1819 through 
to the 1952 Patent Act, simply adheres to the “course” and “principles” 
of courts of equity.130 Totally absent from the legislation is the 
“unequivocal statement” the Court seeks from Congress when the latter 
wishes to depart from a principle of “equity practice with a background 
of several hundred years of history.”131 
B. Legal Relief: Retrospectively Limited and Inadequate 
Our next point is that the remedy available “at law” in federal 
courts today, though now embodied in 35 U.S.C. § 284, appears to 
suffer from the same impediment as in England. Initially, that is 
because the English rule barring damages at common law for post-writ 
wrongs carried over to the courts of the United States, subject now to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, which allows recovery for actionable 
wrongs occurring between the filing of the complaint and the time of 
 
129. W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 633; accord Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. 445, 
466 (2015); Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 59; see also United States v. Or. State 
Med. Soc’y, 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952) (“All it takes . . . is a real threat of 
future violation or a contemporary violation of a nature likely to continue 
or recur.”). Although the language quoted above sounds eerily familiar to 
a mootness analysis, the Court views mootness as a separate inquiry. E.g., 
W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 632–33. Like Goshen, these cases also did not 
address whether courts could presume future violations from past ones. 
130. See Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481, 481–82; Act of July 4, 1836, 
ch. 357, § 17, 5 Stat. 117, 124; Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 55, 16 Stat. 
198, 206; Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 391, § 6, 29 Stat. 692, 694; Act of Feb. 
18, 1922, ch. 58, § 8, 42 Stat. 389, 392; Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 726, 60 
Stat. 778, 778; Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, § 283, 66 Stat. 792, 812. 
131. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944); accord eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–92 (2006); Holmberg v. 
Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 30–33. 
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trial.132 The Supreme Court, for instance, used the common-law rule to 
affirm jury instructions in a pair of patent and antitrust cases that only 
allowed recovery for wrongs occurring before the action was filed.133 And 
in another patent case, the Court stated that, in an action at law, one 
“could only recover damages for past infringements.”134 Practitioners 
similarly understood that the legal remedy was “limited . . . to the 
recovery of damages for past infringements.”135 
In 1984, the Federal Circuit implicitly acknowledged the common-
law rule. It stated that the “general rule [is] that only those acts 
committed before the complaint is filed may be considered at trial,” 
while recognizing that a patentee could file supplemental complaints 
under Rule 15(d) to capture actionable wrongs through trial.136 And 
more recently, the court stated, when reviewing a jury verdict, that the 
word “‘damages,’ . . . by definition[,] covers only past” wrongs, and 
thus a jury instructed to award a reasonable royalty as “damages” 
would not ordinarily think of future wrongs.137 
Despite the foregoing, the Federal Circuit has (as we explain below) 
allowed juries to award legal damages in a lump sum for future 
infringements in certain circumstances. That might lead one to conclude 
that because damages for future wrongs are now available at law, the 
 
132. Gómez-Arostegui, supra note 78, at 1682–84, 1691, 1708–12; Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 15(d) (allowing supplemental complaints). 
133. Suffolk Co. v. Hayden, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 315, 320 (1866), aff’g 11 F. Cas. 
900, 907 (C.D. Mass. 1862) (No. 6,261); Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522, 
536 (1915), aff’g 209 F. 721, 729 (2d Cir. 1913); see also Wicker v. 
Hoppock, 73 U.S. 94, 99 (1867) (contract); Bradley v. Washington, 
Alexandria & Georgetown Steam Packet Co., 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 107, 116 
(1835) (assumpsit). 
134. Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pac. Bridge Co., 185 U.S. 282, 290 (1902); 
accord Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 430 
(1908); Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64, 64 (1876). 
135. 1 James Love Hopkins, The Law of Patents § 375, at 503 (1911); 
accord Stedman, supra note 125, § 232, at 557; 3 Deller, supra note 
125, § 538, at 1816–17, 1959; Albert H. Walker, John H. Hilliard 
& Eugene Eblé, Text-Book of the Law Patents for Inventions 
§ 572, at 636 (5th ed. 1917); 3 Robinson, supra note 125, § 932, at 112, 
§ 1053, at 321; cf. Eaton S. Drone, A Treatise on the Law of 
Property in Intellectual Productions 496–97 (Boston, 1879) 
(noting in the context of copyrights that the “remedies afforded by law 
are available only when the wrong has been done”). 
136. Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instr., Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 
1984); cf. De Graffenried v. United States, 228 Ct. Cl. 780, 784 (1981) 
(“[R]elief for future [patent] infringements is beyond the power of th[is] 
court by declaratory judgment or otherwise.”). 
137. WhitServe, LLC v. Comput. Pkgs., Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 35 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(concluding that a jury had not awarded a paid-in-full, lump-sum license). 
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prospect of additional actions is a thing of the past, and the remedy at 
law is no longer inadequate. 
We would respond by first noting that when it has allowed legal 
damages for infringements that have yet to occur, the Federal Circuit 
has done so without considering that section 284 does not expressly 
empower courts to award such relief. When a statute is silent on a 
matter, courts must presume that Congress adopted established 
“adjudicatory principles,”138 like the aforesaid common-law bar, and 
other “prominent feature[s] of the relevant [decisional] landscape”139 
before enactment. The Federal Circuit has yet to review either closely, 
nor has it considered the relevant legislative history indicating that 
section 284 compensates patentees for past, not future, infringements.140 
In short, there is a substantial question whether the Federal Circuit has 
always acted with statutory or common-law authority. 
Second, even if authorized, the court’s use of legal damages for 
future infringements has been limited, and it therefore remains 
unavailable in many cases. The Federal Circuit has never, to our 
knowledge, held that a patentee can recover “lost profit” damages under 
section 284 for infringements expected to occur after judgment.141 
Rather, nearly every instance approved thus far by that court has 
involved a jury awarding, as a “reasonable royalty,” a paid-up, lump-
sum license for all infringements past and future.142 Moreover, when 
 
138. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991). 
139. SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 
S. Ct. 954, 963, 966 (2017); accord Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 
544, 551 (2019). 
140. Section 284 of the 1952 Patent Act “merely ‘reorganiz[ed] in language’” 
predecessor provisions enacted in 1946. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top 
Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505 n.20 (1964) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 
82-1923, at 10, 29 (1952)). The 1946 legislative history notes that the 
purpose of its damages provision—which called for “general damages 
which shall be due compensation[,] . . . not less than a reasonable 
royalty,” 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946)—was to remedy “past infringement,” 
while injunctions prevented future infringement. Recovery in Patent 
Infringement Suits: Hearing Before the Comm. on Patents on H.R. 5231, 
79th Cong., 2d Sess., at 7 (1946) (statement of Conder C. Henry, Ass’t 
Comm’r of Patents); accord S. Rep. No. 79-1503, at 2 (1946); H.R. Rep. 
No. 79-1587, at 1 (1946). For a discussion of the limited scope and 
application of reasonable-royalty awards before 1952, see Michael Risch, 
(Un)reasonable Royalties, 98 B.U. L. Rev. 187 (2018); Leon H. Amdur, 
Patent Law and Practice § 6, at 993, §§ 13–14, at 1003–10 (1935). 
141. Cf. Gómez-Arostegui, supra note 78, at 1683 n.112, 1709–10 (contrasting 
future damages caused solely by past infringements). 
142. E.g., Prism Techs., LLC v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 849 F.3d 1360, 1377–
78 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs., 802 F.3d 1283, 
1300–01 (Fed. Cir. 2015). But see Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite 
Pictures Corp., 274 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (5-year license). 
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contested, the Federal Circuit has only allowed this form of relief when 
the proof supports it. Evidence must demonstrate that a hypothetical 
negotiation between the parties, entered into before infringement began, 
would have resulted in a lump-sum, paid-in-full license.143 For many 
patented inventions this will not be the case. Alternatively and more 
theoretically, a suit might involve an already “established royalty”144 in 
the form of an upfront license fee sought by the patentee for the future 
exercise of a patent, by which is generally meant a licensing scheme 
open to all comers.145 If neither a hypothetical reasonable royalty nor 
an already established royalty would cover all infringements for the life 
of the patent, paid in a lump sum, then a jury will often award a lump-
sum amount that covers pre-judgment infringements only. 
Importantly, if a patentee obtains a lump-sum award at trial for all 
infringements, past and future, then a final injunction is unnecessary, 
and barring confusion over a verdict or a concern the defendant will 
not pay the award, the patentee will not seek a final injunction.146 
 
143. Enplas Tech Sols., Inc. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co., 909 F.3d 398, 409–12 
(Fed. Cir. 2018); Laserdynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694 F.3d 
51, 79–80 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Wordtech Sys., Inc. v. Integrated Networks 
Sols., Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1319–21 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Lucent Techs., Inc. 
v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324–36 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
144. Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 648–49 
(1915); Rude v. Wescott, 130 U.S. 152, 165 (1889). 
145. William C. Rooklidge et al., Compensatory Damages Issues in 
Patent Infringement Cases 8–12 (2d ed. 2017) (Fed. Jud. Ctr.); 
Stedman, supra note 125, § 232, at 555–56; 3 Robinson, supra note 125, 
§ 1055, at 324–29; e.g., Emerson v. Simm, 8 F. Cas. 640, 641–42 
(C.C.D.N.J. 1873) (No. 4,443) (limited to future use); Sickels v. Borden, 
22 F. Cas. 67, 70–71 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1856) (No. 12,832) (same). An 
established royalty is less likely to result in a full course of litigation, and 
we are unaware of the Federal Circuit having ever approved one that 
comprehensively covered past and future infringements in a lump sum. 
146. Ambiguous verdicts are not uncommon and might lead patentees to 
believe that the jury did not compensate them for future infringements. 
E.g., Prism, 849 F.3d at 1377–78. Additionally, a lump-sum award only 
eliminates future infringements once the defendant has paid it. To avoid 
the prospect of future infringement as a trigger of equitable jurisdiction, 
and the additional argument that the legal remedy is inadequate due to 
an inability to pay it, a defendant could be required, in forestalling a final 
injunction, to post security sufficient to cover the entire lump-sum award. 
See 3 Robinson, supra note 125, § 1088, at 400–01; cf. Amstar Corp. v. 
Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d 1538, 1548–49 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (utilizing 
exhaustion doctrine sub silentio to refuse to enjoin a purchaser and user 
of seven infringing devices because the patentee had obtained a damages 
award on the sale of those devices against a co-defendant who manu-
factured them, and the parent company of the manufacturer guaranteed 
to pay the award). A district court could also grant the final injunction, 
and actually enjoin the defendant, but permit the defendant to buy it out 
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Largely, then, it is plaintiffs who do not receive prospective compen-
sation at trial that will seek an injunction. For them, post-judgment 
infringements are still not compensable at law, and therefore the legal 
remedy is just as inadequate today as it was in 1789. Stated another 
way, federal courts today have equitable jurisdiction over every request 
for final injunctive relief where the legal damages awarded at trial do 
not fully compensate the plaintiff for the life of the patent, and where 
future infringements remain likely. 
 
* * * 
With the historical record and prior two sections in mind, the 
modern implications should crystallize. In cases where a patentee seeks 
a final injunction, federal courts today can presume, in accordance with 
traditional equitable principles, and much like the Federal Circuit did 
before 2011, that a patentee is likely to suffer injury in the absence of 
a final injunction, and that the “remedies available at law . . . are 
inadequate to compensate”147 the patentee for that injury. Future 
infringement itself is a cognizable injury, and federal courts can presume 
from a defendant’s past infringement that future infringements are 
likely and that the legal remedy is inadequate. The more debatable 
question is what courts should require a defendant to present to over-
come the presumptions. Some of the details of that inquiry—such as 
whether the defendant has a burden of persuasion or production—are 
beyond the scope of this Article. But we will note that insofar as the 
presumptions are substantive (and not procedural)148 that might 
indicate that a defendant bears a burden of persuasion, rather than a 
burden of production. Regardless of the obligation, two main rebuttals 
appear available. A defendant can demonstrate to the court’s satisfac-
tion that it is unlikely to infringe again. Or it might demonstrate that 
a lump-sum trial award fully compensated the patentee for all future 
infringements, and that it has the ability to satisfy the entire judgment. 
Additionally, and without relying on any presumptions, patentees 
could simply bear the full burden of proof themselves. Patentees need 
only show that in the absence of a final injunction future infringement 
is more likely than not and that any lump-sum award at trial did not 
fully compensate them for the life of the patent. A defendant might 
even concede the points. 
Strictly speaking, a defendant’s undue hardship and the public in-
terest do not affect the likelihood of future infringement or render the 
remedy at law adequate. Those are separate considerations, and we take 
 
just as soon as the defendant is able to satisfy the lump-sum award. 
Satisfaction would obviate the need for ongoing equitable jurisdiction. 
147. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
148. Some authorities conflict. Compare sources cited supra note 36, with Fed. 
R. Evid. 301. 
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no position whether, given the historical record, they could or should 
continue to play a role on requests for final injunctions. We suggest 
only that, insofar as they are relevant, these two factors are the natural 
place to consider whether an injunction would unfairly burden defend-
ants (perhaps where a plaintiff’s invention forms a very small, but 
inextricable, part of a defendant’s product) or unduly harm the public. 
C. Alternative Equitable Relief: Ongoing Royalties 
One last matter requires our attention. In an effort to avoid the 
prospect of future lawsuits between the same parties, the Federal Cir-
cuit approved a new form of prospective equitable relief in 2007: an 
ongoing royalty in lieu of a final injunction. The court endorsed the 
remedy after eBay in Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., while 
acknowledging that no statute provided for ongoing royalties in patent 
cases and that royalties would not “prevent the violation of any right 
secured by patent,” something 35 U.S.C. § 283 requires.149 Notably, the 
infringer in Paice, Toyota, had not argued that section 283 (or 284) 
authorized this type of relief; instead, Toyota relied on a federal court’s 
inherent and “traditional equitable powers.”150 This alternative form of 
relief has been profoundly important because it is a major reason federal 
courts have felt comfortable denying injunctive relief to patentees who 
have prevailed at trial.151 And by selectively treating this form of mon-
etary relief as a remedy at law, courts have expressly required patentees 
to prove that an ongoing royalty would provide inadequate redress.152 
 
149. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(quoting 35 U.S.C. § 283, which authorizes “injunctions”); cf. AMG Cap. 
Mgmt. v. FTC, 141 S. Ct. 1341, 1347 (2021) (stating that authorizing 
injunctive relief in a statute “is not the same as [authorizing] an award of 
equitable monetary relief”); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ 
Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 497 (2001) (“[A] court sitting in equity cannot ‘ignore 
the judgment of Congress, deliberately expressed in legislation.’” (quoting 
Virginian R. Co. v. Ry. Emps., 300 U.S. 515, 551 (1937))); INS v. 
Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 883 (1988) (same); Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar 
Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 203 (1985) (same). 
150. Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 52–55, Paice, 504 F.3d 1293 
(Nos. 2006-1610, -1631). Although the Federal Circuit recently declared 
that Paice found this authority in section 283, see Prism, 849 F.3d at 
1377, that misstates Paice. 
151. See generally Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent 
Litigation After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 1949 
(2016); Christopher B. Seaman, Ongoing Royalties in Patent Cases After 
eBay: An Empirical Assessment and Proposed Framework, 23 Tex. 
Intell. Prop. L.J. 203 (2015). 
152. E.g., ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Comms. Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Solutran, Inc. v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 13-CV-02637, 
2019 WL 405513, at *26 (D. Minn. Jan. 18, 2019); EcoServices, LLC v. 
Certified Aviation Servs., LLC, 340 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1023–28 (C.D. Cal. 
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There are two problems here. Most fundamentally, Paice was 
wrongly decided. As one of us has argued elsewhere at length, federal 
courts lack the authority to award ongoing royalties for post-judgment 
infringements. Apart from the absence of statutory authorization, the 
English Court of Chancery did not recognize a remedy like this in 1789, 
which is the time and place the Supreme Court looks to for the default, 
equitable remedies of the federal courts.153 Second, because ongoing 
royalties are an equitable remedy,154 they actually do nothing to impede 
the conclusion, reached a few paragraphs ago, that patentees have no 
adequate remedy at law. Indeed, that conclusion must stand in order 
to trigger the equitable jurisdiction necessary to award an ongoing 
royalty in lieu of a final injunction. A federal court cannot redress an 
injury with any equitable remedy when the court has concluded the 
plaintiff has a suitable remedy at law for it.155 There is the Seventh 
Amendment to consider: a party should not be forced to face an 
equitable remedy assessed by a judge when an adequate remedy, and a 
right to a jury trial, would be available at law.156 The Federal Circuit 
seems to have lost sight of the above, along with the nature of the 
remedy itself, when it recently and inconsistently stated that ongoing 
royalties are an “adequate remedy at law,”157 despite ruling several 
times previously that the remedy was equitable and thus not subject to 
a constitutional right to a jury trial.158 
 
2018); Schwendimann v. Arkwright Advanced Coating, Inc., No. 11-820, 
2018 WL 3621206, at *24–25 (D. Minn. July 30, 2018). 
153. Gómez-Arostegui, supra note 78, at 1682–1728; see also Trump v. Hawaii, 
138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“This Court has 
never treated general statutory grants of equitable authority as giving 
federal courts a freewheeling power to fashion new forms of equitable 
remedies. Rather, it has read such statutes as constrained by ‘the body of 
law which had been transplanted to this country from the English Court 
of Chancery’ in 1789.” (quoting Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 
(1945))). 
154. Prism, 849 F.3d at 1378; Paice, 504 F.3d at 1313–16 & n.13. Further 
supporting this characterization is that all money judgments at law must 
be for a specific amount, and periodic or contingent awards are not 
permitted. Slater v. Mexican Nat’l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 128 (1904); 
Dobbs & Roberts, supra note 124, at 220, 265. 
155. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 75–76 (1992); Dairy 
Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962). 
156. Gómez-Arostegui, supra note 78, at 1728–30; see also supra text 
accompanying note 21. 
157. ActiveVideo, 694 F.3d at 1340; see also TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 
259, 282–83 (3d Cir. 2019) (making the same mistake in a copyright case). 
158. See supra note 154; see also SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First 
Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 807 F.3d 1311, 1331–33 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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At some point, the Supreme Court should clarify two things. The 
first is whether a plaintiff must demonstrate, before obtaining a final 
injunction, that no other equitable remedy would suffice to redress a 
defendant’s future actionable wrongs. Perhaps that is what the Court 
had in mind when it included “irreparable” injury as the first eBay 
factor; but if so, it did so obliquely.159 A remedial hierarchy preferring 
legal over equitable relief is understandable in light of constitutional 
jury-trial concerns and the coercive power of equitable decrees. It is also 
well supported by traditional equitable principles. But it is doctrinally 
unclear why a federal court must subjugate one form of final equitable 
relief (an injunction) to another (ongoing royalties), especially when 
English equity practice contained no support for that proposition, and 
the latter remedy was only recently judicially adopted for all patent 
cases in 2007. Contrary to the Court’s appeal to “traditional” and “well-
established” equitable principles in eBay, awards of ongoing royalties 
can hardly be said to be a traditional equitable option. 
Lastly, the Court must squarely address whether federal courts 
actually have the power to impose an ongoing royalty in lieu of a final 
injunction in patent cases. The point has yet to be directly contested 
at the Court, and it has sent conflicting messages, all without the 
benefit of any historical evidence. On the one hand, it has stated in 
dictum in a copyright case that an ongoing royalty may be available in 
some circumstances.160 But in eBay, four justices, also in dictum, spoke 
only of “legal damages” as a possible substitute for a patent 
injunction.161 Given the Court’s obvious understanding of the difference 
between legal damages and equitable monetary relief,162 it seems likely 
that these justices were not thinking, at the time, of alternative 
equitable relief. In any case, the Court must reconcile two facts: that 
Congress has never authorized ongoing royalties in patent cases, and 
that the Court has ruled that Congress must act if it wishes courts to 
employ a novel equitable remedy—one not recognized by the 18th-
century Chancery. 
 
159. See also Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 165–66 
(2010) (stating that a final injunction should not be granted if a “less 
drastic” remedy is available). But see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–
44 (1971) (appearing to equate irreparable injury with the inadequate-
remedy-at-law requirement); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 
U.S. 531, 545 (1987) (same); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge 
Co., 54 U.S. 518, 561, 564 (1852) (same). 
160. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 687–88 (2014) 
(drawing from a suggestion made by the government). 
161. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006) 
(Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., concurring). 
162. E.g., SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 
137 S. Ct. 954, 964, 966, 969–70 (2017); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 
U.S. 248, 253–58 (1993); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583 (1978). 
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Conclusion 
Two important points emerge from the preceding discussion. 
First, we offer clear grounds for the Federal Circuit to overrule its 
2011 decision in Bosch where it abandoned its separate presumptions 
concerning irreparable injury and the lack of an adequate remedy at 
law. The Supreme Court never ruled on those presumptions in eBay, 
and the Federal Circuit renounced them without the benefit of briefing 
or considering the historical record. Traditional equitable principles, 
originating from a period the Court has indicated is the most crucial, 
demonstrate that federal courts can recognize future infringement per 
se as a cognizable injury, presume future infringement, and presume 
the inadequacy of legal damages. Alternatively, courts can simply 
recognize, without relying on any presumptions, that the burden on the 
first two eBay factors is not onerous. A patentee can satisfy them by 
showing that a defendant is likely to infringe again without a final 
injunction and that any legal damages awarded at trial did not fully 
compensate the patentee for the life of the patent. The same historical 
record demonstrates that in order to obtain a final injunction patentees 
do not have to prove that some other form of equitable relief, like 
ongoing royalties, would be inadequate to redress future infringements. 
Second, and similarly, we demonstrate that if Congress chooses to 
reinstate the separate presumptions—as some stakeholders have asked 
it to do—it can do so with the knowledge that it would be comporting 
with eBay and traditional equitable principles rather than overruling 
them. 
